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Abstract 
This paper describes the use of a genetic algorithm (GA) to find optimal parameter-
values for trading agents that operate in virtual online auction “e-marketplaces”, where 
the rules of those marketplaces are also under simultaneous control of the GA. The aim is 
to use the GA to automatically design new mechanisms for agent-based e-marketplaces 
that are more efficient than online markets designed by (or populated by) humans. The 
space of possible auction-types explored by the GA includes the Continuous Double 
Auction (CDA) mechanism (as used in most of the world’s financial exchanges), and also 
two purely one-sided mechanisms. Surprisingly, the GA did not always settle on the 
CDA as an optimum. Instead, novel hybrid auction mechanisms were evolved, which are 
unlike any existing market mechanisms. In this paper we show that, when the market 
supply and demand schedules undergo sudden “shock” changes partway through the 
evaluation process, two-sided hybrid market mechanisms can evolve which may be 
unlike any human-designed auction and yet may also be significantly more efficient than 
any human designed market mechanism.  
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1. Introduction 
For thousands of years, buyers and sellers have come together to exchange money for 
goods or services. Economists use the word “auction” to refer to the mechanism (or rules) 
by which buyers and sellers interact in such marketplaces. Almost all traders in the global 
international financial markets interact via a particular form of auction market 
mechanism known as the continuous double auction (CDA), more details of which will 
be given later.
1  The CDA has been the subject of much study by economists, partially 
because it is so important in the world of finance, but also because CDA markets 
typically exhibit a very attractive characteristic: experimental studies have demonstrated 
that the transaction prices in a CDA market rapidly converge on the market’s theoretical 
equilibrium price. Students of microeconomics know the equilibrium price as the price at 
which the market’s supply and demand curves intersect; but, colloquially, the equilibrium 
price is important because if transactions are taking place at off-equilibrium prices then 
someone somewhere in the market is being ripped off. Hence, rapid equilibration is 
desirable in any auction. The precise reasons why CDA markets typically exhibit rapid 
and stable equilibration are still the topic of research and debate (see e.g. [12]).  
 
With the advent of e-commerce, various forms of auction mechanism have become very 
popular for online trading, and web-based auction sites such as www.ebay.com have 
proven highly successful. As auctions dematerialize, moving online and becoming virtual 
“e-marketplaces”, it becomes perfectly plausible for software-agent “robot” traders to 
participate in those auctions. In comparison to human traders, such “bots” have the 
                                                           
1  It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a review of all possible auction 
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advantage of being very fast and very cheap, and in principle they can assimilate and act 
on volumes of data that would swamp even the most able of human traders.    
 
ZIP (Zero-Intelligence-Plus) artificial trading agents, introduced in [3], are software-
agent “trader bots” that use simple machine learning techniques to adapt to operating as 
buyers or sellers in open-outcry auction-market environments similar to those used in 
Smith’s [22] pioneering experimental economics studies of the CDA and other auction 
mechanisms. ZIP traders were originally developed as a solution to the pathological 
failures of Gode & Sunder’s (1993) “ZI” (Zero-Intelligence) traders, but recent work at 
IBM by Das et al. [11] has shown that ZIP traders (unlike ZI traders) consistently out-
perform human traders in human-against-robot experimental economics CDA 
marketplaces. The ZIP traders consistently made profits a few percentage points higher 
than did the human traders they were competing against. Das et al. [11] wrote that the 
“…successful demonstration of machine superiority in the CDA … could have a … 
powerful financial impact – one that might be measured in billions of dollars annually”, 
and in their conclusions they speculate on the future possibility of online e-marketplaces 
currently populated by human traders becoming populated entirely by trader agents. 
 
The operation of ZIP traders has been successfully demonstrated in experimental versions 
of CDA markets similar to those found in the international financial markets for 
commodities, equities, capital, and derivatives; and in posted-offer auction markets 
similar to those seen in domestic high-street retail outlets [3]. In any such market, there 
are a number of numeric parameters that govern the adaptation and trading processes of 
the ZIP traders. In the original 1997 version of ZIP traders, the values of these were set D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             4 
by hand, using “educated guesses”.  However, subsequent papers [4,5] presented the first 
results from using a standard technique to automatically optimize these parameter values, 
thereby eliminating the need for skilled human input in deciding the values. 
  
Prior to the research described in [6], in all previous work using artificial trading agents – 
ZIP or otherwise – the market mechanism (i.e., the type of auction the agents are 
interacting within) had been fixed in advance. Well-known market mechanisms from 
human economic affairs include: the English auction (where sellers stay silent and buyers 
quote increasing bid-prices), the Dutch Flower auction (where buyers stay silent and 
sellers quote decreasing offer-prices); the Vickery or second-price sealed-bid auction 
(where sealed bids are submitted by buyers, and the highest bidder is allowed to buy, but 
at the price of the second-highest bid: game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that this 
mechanism encourages honesty and is robust to attack by dishonest means); and the CDA 
(where sellers announce decreasing offer prices while simultaneously and 
asynchronously the buyers announce increasing bid prices, with the sellers being free to 
accept any buyer’s bid at any time and the buyers being free to accept any seller’s offer at 
any time, in the absence of an auctioneer).  
 
In this paper, we explore in detail the some specific consequences of asking the following 
question: if, as Das et al. [11] speculate, trader agents will come to replace human traders 
in online e-marketplaces, then why should those online e-marketplaces use auction 
mechanisms designed by humans, for humans? Perhaps there are new market 
mechanisms, suitable only to populations of robot-traders, that are more efficient (or 
otherwise more attractive) than currently-known human-based mechanisms.  D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             5 
 
Designing new market mechanisms is hard, and the space of possible mechanisms is vast. 
For this reason it is attractive to use an automated search of the space of possible 
mechanisms: in essence, we ask a computer to do the auction-design for us. This paper 
reports on exploring the application of one type of automated search/optimization 
algorithm, which is inspired by Darwinian notions of evolution via random variation and 
directed selection, and hence is known as a Genetic Algorithms (GA).  
 
The first results from experiments where a GA optimizes not only the parameter values 
for the ZIP trading agents, but also the style of market mechanism in which those traders 
operate, were presented in [6]. To do this, a space of possible market mechanisms was 
created for evolutionary exploration. The space includes the CDA and also one-sided 
auctions similar (but not actually identical to) the English Auction (EA) and the Dutch 
Flower Auction (DFA). Significantly, this space is continuously variable, allowing for 
any of an infinite number of peculiar hybrids of these auction types to be evolved, which 
have no known correlate in naturally occurring (i.e., human-designed) market 
mechanisms. While there is nothing to prevent the GA from settling on solutions that 
correspond to the known CDA auction type or the EA-like and DFA-like one-sided 
mechanisms, it was found that hybrid solutions can lead to the most desirable market 
dynamics. Although the hybrid market mechanisms could easily be implemented in 
online electronic marketplaces, they have not been designed by humans: rather they are 
the product of an automated search through a continuous space of possible auction-types. 
Thus, the results in [6] were the first demonstration that radically new market 
mechanisms for artificial traders may be designed by automatic means. D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             6 
This is not a trivial academic point: although the efficiency of the evolved market 
mechanisms are typically only a few percentage points (or even only a few basis points) 
better than those of the established human-designed mechanisms, the economic 
consequences could be highly significant. According to figures released by the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the total value of trades on the CDA-based NYSE for the year 
2000 was $11060bn (i.e., a little over 11 trillion dollars: see [16]). If only 0.1% of that 
liquidity could be eliminated or captured by a more efficient evolved market mechanism, 
the value saved (or profit generated) would still be in excess of $10bn.  And that is just 
for one market: similar savings could presumably made at NASDAQ, at European 
exchanges such as LSE and LIFFE, and at similar exchanges elsewhere around the globe. 
 
Section 2 gives an overview of ZIP traders and of the experimental methods used, 
including a description of the continuously-variable space of auction types. This 
description is largely identical to the account given in previous papers [6,7], albeit 
extended to describe how the new experiments whose results are presented here differ 
from the previous work. The new results are presented in Section 3 and are discussed in 
Section 4. Related work is reviewed in Section 5, and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Zero-Intelligence-Plus (ZIP) Traders 
ZIP trading agents are described fully in a lengthy report [3], which includes sample 
source-code in the C programming language. For the purposes of this paper a high-level 
description of the key parameters is sufficient.  
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ZIP traders deal in arbitrary abstract commodities. Each ZIP trader i is given a private 
(i.e., secret) limit-price, λi, which for a seller is the price below which it must not sell and 
for a buyer is the price above which it must not buy. If a ZIP trader completes a 
transaction at its λi price then it generates zero utility (“profit” for the sellers or “saving” 
for the buyers). For this reason, each ZIP trader i maintains a time-varying utility margin 
µi(t) and generates quote-prices pi(t) at time t according to pi(t)=λi(1+µi(t)) for sellers and 
pi(t)=λi(1-µi(t)) for buyers. The “aim” of traders is to maximize their utility over all 
trades, where utility is the difference between the accepted quote-price and the trader’s λi 
value. Trader i is given an initial value µi(0) (i.e., µi(t) for t=0) which is subsequently 
adapted over time using a simple machine learning technique known as the Widrow-Hoff 
rule which is also used in back-propagation neural networks [20] and in learning 
classifier systems [24]. This rule has a “learning rate” parameter βi that governs the speed 
of convergence between trader i’s quoted price pi(t) and the trader’s idealized “target” 
price τi(t). When calculating τi(t), traders introduce a small random absolute perturbation 
generated from
2 U[0,ca] (this perturbation is positive when increasing τi(t), negative 
when decreasing) and also a small random relative perturbation generated from U[1-cr,1] 
(when decreasing τi(t)) or U[1,1+cr] (when increasing τi(t)). Here ca and cr are global 
system constants. To smooth over noise in the learning system, there is an additional 
“momentum” parameter γi for each trader (such momentum terms are also commonly 
used in back-propagation neural networks).  
 
                                                           
2 Note that in this paper v=U[x,y] denotes a random real value v generated from a uniform 
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Thus, adaptation in each ZIP trader i has the following parameters: initial margin µi(0); 
learning rate βi; and momentum term γi.  In an entire market populated by ZIP traders, 
values for these three parameters are randomly assigned to each trader via the following 
expressions: µi(0)=U(µmin, µmin+µ∆); βi=U(βmin, βmin+β∆); and γi=U(γmin, γmin+ ∆).   γ
 
Hence, to initialize an entire ZIP-trader market it is necessary to specify values for the six 
market-initialization parameters µmin, µ∆, βmin, β∆, γmin, and γ∆; and also for the two global 
system constants ca and cr. And so it can be seen that any set of initialization parameters 
for a ZIP-trader market exists within an eight-dimensional real space. Vectors in this 8-
space can be considered as “genotypes” in a genetic algorithm (GA), and from an initial 
population of such genotypes it is possible to allow a GA to find new genotype vectors 
that best satisfy an appropriate evaluation function. This is exactly the process that was 
introduced in [4,5], and that is described further below. Before that, the issue of 
simulating the passage of time is discussed.  
 
When monitoring events in a real auction, as more precision is used to record the time of 
events, so the likelihood of any two events occurring at exactly the same time is 
diminished. For example, if two bid-quotes made at five minutes past nine are both 
recorded as occurring at 09:05, then they appear to be simultaneous; but a more accurate 
clock would have been able to reveal that the first bid was made at 09:05:01 and the 
second at 09:05:02. Even if two events occur absolutely at the same time, some random 
process (e.g. what direction the auctioneer is looking in) may break the simultaneity.  
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Thus, we may simulate real marketplaces (and implement electronic marketplaces) using 
techniques where each significant event always occurs at a unique time. We may choose 
to represent these by real high-precision times, or we may abstract away from precise 
time-keeping by dividing time (possibly irregularly) into discrete slices, numbered 
sequentially, where one significant event is known to occur in each slice. In the ZIP-
trader markets explored here, we use such a time-slicing approach. In each time-slice, the 
atomic “significant event” is one quote being issued by one trader and the other traders 
then responding either by ignoring the quote or by one of the traders accepting the quote. 
(NB Das et al. [11] used a continuous-time formulation of the ZIP-trader algorithm). 
  
In the markets described here (and in [3,4,5,6,7,8,9]), on each time-slice a ZIP trader i is 
chosen at random from those currently able to quote (i.e. those who hold appropriate 
stock or currency), and trader i’s quote price pi(t) then becomes the “current quote” q(t) 
for time t. Next, all traders j on the contraside (i.e. all buyers j if i is a seller, or all sellers 
j if i is a buyer) compare q(t) to their own current quote price pj(t) and if the quotes cross 
(i.e. if pj(t)<=q(t) for sellers, or if pj(t)>=q(t) for buyers) then the trader j is able to 
accept the quote. If more than one trader is able to accept, one is chosen at random to 
make the transaction. If no traders are able to accept, the quote is regarded as “ignored”. 
Once the trade is either accepted or ignored, the traders update their µ(t) values using the 
learning algorithm outlined above, and the current time-slice ends. This process repeats 
for each time-slice in a trading period, with occasional injections of fresh currency and 
stock, or redistribution of λi limit prices, until either a maximum number of time-slices 
have run, or a maximum number of sequential quotes have been ignored. 
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2.2. A Space of Possible Auctions 
Now consider the case where we implement a ZIP-trader continuous double auction 
(CDA) market. In any one time-slice in a CDA either a buyer or a seller may quote, and 
in the definition of a CDA a quote is equally likely from each side.  One way of 
implementing a CDA is, at the start of each time-slice, to generate a random binary 
variable to determine whether the next quote will come from a buyer or a seller, and then 
to randomly choose one individual as the quoter from whichever side the binary value 
points to. Here, as in previous ZIP work [3,4,5,6,7,8,9] the random binary variable is 
always independently and identically distributed over all time-slices. 
  
So, let Q=b denote the event that a buyer quotes on any one time-slice and let Q=s 
denote the event that a seller quotes, then for the CDA we can write Pr(Q=s)=0.5 and 
note that because Pr(Q=b)=1.0-Pr(Q=s) it is only necessary to specify Pr(Q=s), which 
we will abbreviate to Qs hereafter. Note additionally that in an English Auction (EA) we 
have Qs=0.0, and in the Dutch Flower Auction (DFA) we have Qs=1.0. Thus, there are at 
least three values of Qs (0.0, 0.5, and 1.0) that correspond to three types of auction 
familiar from centuries of human economic affairs. Although the ZIP-trader case of 
Qs=0.5 is indeed a good approximation to the CDA, the fact that any ZIP trader j will 
accept a quote whenever q(t) and pj(t) cross means that the one-sided extreme cases 
Qs=0.0 and Qs=1.0 are not exact analogues of the EA and DFA.  
 
The inventive step introduced in [6] was to consider the Qs values of 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0 not 
as three distinct market mechanisms, but rather as the two endpoints and the midpoint on 
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implementation. For example, Qs=0.1 can be interpreted as specifying an auction 
mechanism where, on the average, for every nine quotes by buyers, there will be one 
quote from a seller. Yet the history of human economic affairs offers no examples of such 
markets: why would anyone suggest such a bizarre way of operating? And who would go 
to the trouble of setting themselves up to act as an auctioneer for such a mechanism? 
Certainly, it is perfectly possible for a human auctioneer to run an auction using a value 
of Qs other than 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0. For any given value of Qs, all that the auctioneer needs is 
an unbiased roulette-wheel partitioned into two segments: one marked “Seller” and 
measuring Qs*360 degrees of arc; the other marked “Buyer” and measuring (1.0-Qs)*360 
degrees of arc. To determine the source of each successive new quote in the auction, the 
auctioneer would spin the wheel and then, depending on whether the ball ends up in the 
“Seller” or the “Buyer” segment, would take the next quote either from a seller or a 
buyer. Clearly, an online version of such an auction mechanism can be implemented in 
only a few lines of code, so long as an appropriate method for generating random 
numbers is available. But (to the best of my knowledge) neither the manual roulette-
wheel version nor the online implementation of such auction mechanisms have ever been 
implemented before for any value of Qs other than 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0.     
 
Nevertheless, there is no a priori reason to argue that these three previously-known 
points on this Qs continuum are the only loci of useful auction types. Maybe there are 
circumstances in which values such as Qs=0.25 (say) are preferred. Given the infinite 
nature of this real continuum it seems appealing to use an automatic exploration process, 
such as the GA, to identify useful values of Qs.   
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Thus, in [6] a ninth dimension was added to the search space, and the genotype in the GA 
became the eight real values for ZIP-trader initialization, plus a real value for Qs.  No 
“NYSE” quote-improvement rule [3] was used in the experiments reported in this paper.  
 
2.3. The Genetic Algorithm 
The simple GA used in [5] is also used here, with one difference. In [5] a population of 
size 30, evolving for 1000 generations, was used. Each experiment was repeated 50 
times, and it was found that several of the experiments yielded multi-modal results. 
However, in all the experiments reported on in that paper, the qualitative nature of the 
outcome of the experiment was very clear by generation 500: all runs settled to a 
particular mode by generation 300, and the improvement in performance (i.e., fitness) 
between generation 500 and generation 1000 was always very small. Thus the 
experiments reported here were ended after 500 generations. All other GA control 
parameters are unchanged. For an introduction to GAs, see [14] or [15]. 
 
In each generation, all individuals were evaluated and assigned a fitness value; and the 
next generation’s population was then generated via mutation and crossover on parents 
identified using rank-based tournament selection. Elitism (where, on each generation, an 
unadulterated version of the fittest individual from the evaluated population is copied into 
the new successor population) was also used.   
 
The genome of each individual was simply a vector of nine real values. In each 
experiment, the initial random population was created by generating random values from 
U[0,1] for each locus on each individual’s genotype. Crossover points were between the D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             13 
real values, and crossover was governed by a Poisson random process with an average of 
between one and two crosses per reproduction event. Mutation was implemented by 
adding random values from U[-m(g),+m(g)] where m(g) is the mutation limit at 
generation g (starting the count at g=0). Mutation was applied to each locus in each 
genotype on each individual generated from a reproduction event, but the mutation limit 
m(g) was gradually reduced via an exponential-decay annealing function of the form: 
log10(m(g))=log10(ms)-((g/(ng-1)).log10(ms/me)) where ng is the number of generations 
(here ng=1000 for consistency with [6], despite the fact that all experiments are now 
terminated after 500 generations) and ms is the “start” mutation limit (i.e., for m(0)) and 
me is the “end” mutation limit (i.e., for m(ng-1)). In all the experiments reported here, as 
in [6], ms=0.05 and me=0.0005.    
   
If ever mutation caused the value at a locus to fall outside the range [0.0,1.0] it was 
simply clipped to stay within that range. This clip-to-fit approach to dealing with out-of-
range mutations has been shown [1] to bias evolution toward extreme values (i.e. the 
upper and lower bounds of the clipping), and so Qs values of 0.0 or 1.0 are, if anything, 
more likely than values within those bounds. Moreover, initial and mutated genome 
values of µ∆, β∆, and γ∆ were clipped where necessary to satisfy the constraints 
(µmin+µ∆)<=1.0, (βmin+β∆)<=1.0, and (γmin+γ∆)<=1.0. 
 
The fitness of genotypes was evaluated using the methods described in [4,5,6]. One trial 
of a particular genome was performed by initializing a ZIP-trader market from the 
genome, and then allowing the ZIP traders to operate within the market for a fixed 
number of trading periods, with allocations of stock and currency being replenished D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             14 
between each trading period. During each trading period, Smith’s [22] α measure (root 
mean square deviation of transaction prices from the theoretical market equilibrium 
price) was monitored, and a weighted average of α was calculated across the trading 
periods in the trial, using the method described in Section 2.5 below. As the outcome of 
any one such trial is influenced by stochasticity in the system, the final fitness value for 
an individual was calculated as the arithmetic mean of 100 such trials. Note that as 
minimal deviation of transaction prices from the theoretical equilibrium price is desirable, 
lower scores are better: we aim to minimize fitness scores.  
 
2.4. Previous Results 
Results from nine investigative sets of experiments have been presented in our prior 
publications. Those results are included for completeness in the tables presented in 
Section 3, where results from an additional 23 new experiments are published for the first 
time. All the experiments whose results are tabulated in Section 3 involve evaluating the 
performance of the evolving auction-market mechanisms on one or more of four market 
supply and demand schedules. These four schedules are referred to as markets M1, M2, 
M3, and M4, and are illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
*** FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE *** 
 
In all four schedules there are 11 buyers and 11 sellers, each empowered to buy/sell one 
unit of commodity: these relatively small numbers are the cause of the stepped supply 
and demand curves. Market M1 is taken from [22]. The remaining three markets are 
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while the slope of the supply curve has been increased only slightly; and in M4 the slope 
of the supply curve has been greatly reduced while the slope of the demand curve has 
been increased only slightly. In M3 the slopes of both the supply and demand curves are 
only slightly steeper than the slopes in M1. Despite the apparent similarity between M1 
and M3, a detailed empirical study presented in [8] demonstrated that these minor 
differences between the supply and demand curves in M1 and M3 can lead to significant 
differences in the final best evolved solutions.  
 
In the so-called “single-schedule” experiments, only one of the market schedules was 
used throughout the evolutionary process. Results from the four single-schedule 
experiments are summarized in Table 1 in Section 3. The key qualitative issue is that in 
all four experiments, the best evolved mechanisms all differed from the CDA, and in two 
cases the best evolved mechanism was not even a one-sided auction like the EA or DFA 
mechanisms; rather, the best evolved auction-mechanism was a peculiar hybrid, partway 
between the CDA and a pure one-sided auction.   
 
However, because for each trial in all four of these experiments a single fixed market 
schedule was used in evaluating the evolving solutions, there is a manifest possibility that 
the GA tailored the final evolved solutions to peculiarities of the specific market supply 
and demand schedules employed – i.e., that it “over-fitted”. To test this hypothesis, a new 
suite of experiments was run, where “shock changes” were inflicted on the market by 
swapping from one schedule to another partway through the evaluation process. The 
results from 19 of these experiments are presented in Section 3. Initially, dual-schedule 
experiments were run, where the supply and demand schedules were suddenly changed D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             16 
halfway through the evaluation process. Some early results from these experiments were 
presented in [7]: these showed that when M1 was used for the first half of the evaluation, 
followed by M2 for the second half (which we refer to here as M1-2), the results evolved 
by the GA were order-dependent. That is, when the order of the schedules was reversed, 
so that in the evaluation process M2 was followed by M1 (which we refer to here as M2-
1), the results differed from the M1-2 case. Furthermore, for both M1-2 and M2-1, the 
optimal evolved values of Qs differed from the values that were found to be optimal when 
evaluation involved either M1 or M2 alone. The M1-2 results are presented in detail in 
the next section, as illustration of the process used to compare the results from evolving-
mechanism (EM) experiments with the results from fixed-mechanism (FM) experiments. 
In all the FM experiments, the value of Qs is not evolved, but the remaining eight ZIP-
trader parameter-values on the genotype are still optimised by the GA. The M2-1 results 
are presented in summary form in Table 2 (Section 3), along with results from new dual-
schedule experiments, presented for the first time in this paper.   
 
The order-dependence shown by the M1-2 and M2-1 results could again potentially be a 
consequence of the GA over-fitting: a “dual schedule” experiment could also reasonably 
be described as a “single-shock” experiment; and perhaps the GA evolved solutions that 
were over-fitted to each particular shock. For instance, in the M1-2 case the GA might be 
over-fitting the evolved parameter-values and market-mechanism to the specific market-
shock of suddenly transitioning from M1 to M2. To explore this possibility, additional 
sets of experiments were run where two shocks occurred during each evaluation process 
(i.e., switching between three schedules). Results from four such sets of triple-schedule 
experiments were presented in [9], all involving schedules M1, M2, and M3. In one D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             17 
experiment, referred to here as M1-2-1, the evaluation involved six trading periods with 
supply and demand determined by M1, then a sudden change to M2, then six periods 
later a reversion to M1 for a final six periods. The other sets of experiments are referred 
to here as M2-1-2, M1-2-3, and M3-2-1 (and so on), the meaning of which should be 
obvious. The results from these four sets of experiments are presented in summary form 
in Table 3 (Section 3) along with results from an additional 14 new sets of experiments.       
For ease of comparison with the single-schedule results presented in [6], a six-period 
duration was used for each market schedule, meaning that a dual-schedule trial lasts for 
12 periods: 6 periods with the ZIP trading agents adapting to trade under the first 
schedule, then at the end of the 6th period a sudden “shock change” of the market supply 
and demand to the second schedule (without altering any of the traders’ parameters or 
variable values), followed by 6 periods of the traders adapting to trade and under that new 
schedule. Similarly, the triple-schedule experiments each lasted for 18 trading periods.  
 
In [6], the evaluation function was a weighted average of Smith’s α measure: in each 
trading period p the value αp was calculated, and the fitness score was computed as 
(1/Σwp).Σ(αp.wp) for p=1…6 with weights w1=1.75, w2=1.5, w3=1.25, and w p>3=1.0. In 
the dual-schedule experiments reported here, this was extended so that p=1…12 and 
wp>6=wp-6.  Similarly, in the triple-schedule experiments, p=1…18 and wp>12=wp-12. 
 
3. Results 
Results from 32 sets of experiments are presented here: one set for each sequence of 
schedules explored. Each set involves 100 individual experiments: 50 repetitions of the 
GA experiment for the evolving-mechanism (EM) case where the value of Qs is under D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             18 
evolutionary control, and (for comparison) a further 50 repetitions for the same sequence 
in the fixed-mechanism (FM) case, where Qs is fixed at the CDA value of 0.5. Of the 32 
sets, 4 are single-schedule, 10 are dual-schedule and the remaining 18 are triple-schedule. 
 
Section 3.1 gives a detailed presentation of results from the M1-2 case, for illustration of 
the process used to compare the EM and FM cases. Section 3.2 then presents tables 
summarizing the results from all the experiments performed so far. 
 
3.1 Detailed Dual-Schedule Results: M1-2 
Figure 2a shows the fitness of all 30 genotypes in the population at each generation from 
1 to 500 in a single run of the M1-2 evolving-market (EM) experiment. In each 
generation the elite (best-scoring) individual is of most interest, and Figure 2b shows the 
trajectory of the elite fitness score for the population shown in Figure 2a. The results 
shown in Figure 2 are non-deterministic: different runs of the GA (with different seed 
values for its random number generator) will yield different elite trajectories.  
 
*** FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE **** 
 
Examining the results from 50 repetitions of this experiment (with a different random 
seed used in each experiment), the results are clearly bimodal. Of the 50 repetitions, in 36 
the elite ends up on fitness minima of about 3.85, while the other two elite fitness mode 
involves less-good minima around 4.2 to 4.3.  Figure 3 shows the evolutionary trajectory 
of the mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of the Qs values on the genomes of the 36 
members of the best elite mode. Clearly, the elite mode uses a hybrid auction mechanism 
partway between the one-sided Qs=0.0 market and the Qs=0.5 CDA. D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             19 
 
*** FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE **** 
 
For comparison, similar trajectories of fitness values were recorded from 50 repetitions of 
the M1-2 experiment in fixed-market (FM) conditions (i.e., where the value of Qs was not 
evolved) for Qs=0.0, Qs=0.5, and Qs=1.0 respectively. Using Qs=0.0 is plausible because 
in [6] separate experiments evolving on M1 and on M2 alone both converged on optima 
at Qs=0.0. Moreover, using Qs=0.5 gives a CDA, which is often celebrated as an auction 
mechanism in which transaction-price equilibration is rapid and stable, so we could 
plausibly expect the best fitness from using that market type. Fixed-market Qs=1.0 results 
were generated as this is analogous to the human-designed DFA mechanism. 
 
With Qs fixed at zero, the mean best-mode elite score is around 4.1; and with Qs=1.0 the 
results are worse, by a factor of more than two [7]. With the fixed CDA Qs=0.5 
mechanism, an average elite fitness of around 4.05 is settled on by almost all 
experiments. To ease the comparison between the EM and FM-CDA results, Figure 4 
shows the mean and standard deviation of the best-mode elite scores on the same graph. 
The EM results are clearly lower (and hence better) than those for the FM CDA. 
 
*** FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE **** 
 
As our fitness values are effectively measures of market efficiency, from Figure 4 it 
appears that using Qs values of around 0.23 give more efficient markets than using the 
previously “known” Qs values such as 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0 for the M1-2 schedule sequence. 
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Noting that the evolved value of Qs=~0.23 is close to ¼, we can informally claim that a  
close approximation of this evolved auction mechanism could easily be implemented in 
an electronic marketplace by allowing, on the average, roughly one quote in four to come 
from a seller while the remaining three quotes in four come from buyers.  
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Having discussed the M1-2 results in detail, the tables in this section show summary data 
for a further 31 sets of experiments (each set consisting of 50 EM experiments and 50 FM 
experiments). As was stated earlier, results for M1, M2, and M3 were presented in [6]; 
Table 1 summarizes those results and presents new results from M4. The column labeling 
for all tables in this paper is as follows. The left-most column indicates the market 
schedules for each row of data. The column labelled “EM:µ” is the mean fitness at 
generation 500 in the best elite mode from the 50 repetitions of the EM (evolving-market) 
experiment, and the column labelled “EM:σ” is the standard deviation for that mean. The 
column labelled “EM:n” shows the number of repetitions of the EM experiment that 
settled on the best elite fitness mode. The columns marked “FM:µ”, “FM:σ”, and “FM:n” 
show the mean fitness, standard deviation of the mean fitness, and number of repetitions 
(from a total of 50) for the best elite fitness mode at generation 500 in the FM (fixed-
market) experiments for each schedule. The column labelled “1%?” shows whether the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test [21] indicates a statistically significant difference at the 
1% confidence level between the EM and FM data. Finally, the columns labelled “Qs:µ” 
and “Qs:σ” respectively show the mean Qs value at generation 500, and the standard 
deviation on that mean, for the best elite mode from the EM experiments. Rows typeset D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             21 
in italics are those for which there is a statistically significant difference at the 1% level 
between the EM and FM best elite mode data. 
 
Results for M1-2 and M2-1 were previously presented in [7]; Table 2 summarizes those 
results and presents new results from an additional 8 single-shock experiments. Results 
for M1-2-1, M2-1-2, M3-2-1 and M1-2-3 were first presented in [9]; results from an 
additional 14 sets of dual-shock experiments are presented for the first time here in 
Tables 3 to 6.  
 
*** TABLE 1 NEAR HERE *** 
 
*** TABLE 2 NEAR HERE *** 
 
Tables 3 to 6 all involve dual-shock (triple-schedule) evaluations, but they are grouped by 
the nature of the shocks. Table 3 shows results from experiments where only the demand 
curve undergoes a major change on each shock. Table 5 shows results from experiments 
where only the supply curve undergoes a major change on each shock. In Table 4, one of 
the two shocks involves a major change only to the demand curve while the other shock 
involves a major change only to the supply curve; and in Table 6 each shock involves a 
major change to both the supply curve and the demand curve.  
 
*** TABLE 3 NEAR HERE *** 
 
*** TABLE 4 NEAR HERE *** 
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*** TABLE 6 NEAR HERE *** 
  
Comparing the data in Tables 1 to 6, three points stand out. First, it is noticeable that in 
some cases, the elite evolved value of Qs may differ quite markedly from the CDA value 
of 0.5, without there being a statistically significant effect on the market dynamics (i.e. on 
the fitness scores) in comparison to the FM Qs=0.5 case. For example, in both M2-1 and 
in M2-3-2 the EM Qs values have a mean that is over two standard deviations away from 
the CDA value of 0.5, which on face value could lead one to expect that the mean EM 
and FM fitness scores would be significantly different; yet they are not.  This is a 
consequence of the optimum Qs value lying on a shallow plateau-like surface in the 
fitness landscape, such that apparently quite different values of Qs yield very similar 
fitness values: a point explored and illustrated in detail in [8]. 
  
The second notable point it that the no-shock and single-shock data are not obviously 
useful in predicting the results of the dual-shock experiments, despite the fact that each of 
the dual-shock sequences explored in Tables 3 to 6 can be considered as the 
concatenation of two of the single-shock sequences explored in Table 2. For instance, 
both M1-2-1 and M2-1-2 involve an M1-2 and an M2-1 transition. In isolation, the mean 
best-mode Qs for M1-2 is 0.226 and for M2-1 is 0.456; yet for M1-2-1 the mean best-
mode Qs is 0.509 and for M2-1-2 it is 0.497.  
 
Finally, it is clear that in the single-schedule (no-shock) experiments of Table 1, 100% of 
the optimum Qs values are non-CDA; while in the dual-schedule (single-shock) 
experiments of Table 2, 70% are non-CDA; and in the triple-schedule (dual-shock) D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             23 
experiments of Tables 3 to 6, the proportion of non-CDA optima drops again to 56%. 
Thus, these new data add further weight to the conjecture (first made in [9]) that the more 
changes to the market supply and demand schedules during evaluation of a genotype, the 
more likely it is that the CDA Qs=0.5 value is the optimal mechanism. That is, in the limit 
when nothing is predictable in advance about the market supply and demand curves, the 
CDA is likely to be the optimal mechanism. A corollary to this is that if there is some 
regularity in the market supply and demand, then a hybrid auction mechanism might 
exhibit better dynamics than a CDA.   
 
4. Discussion 
This paper extends the line of research first reported on in [6]. It again demonstrates the 
use of an evolutionary search through an infinite space of possible market designs that 
includes the CDA of Qs=0.5 and also the two pure one-sided solutions of Qs=0.0 and 
Qs=1.0. Again, in the majority of our experiments, new “hybrid” market mechanisms 
were found to give better market dynamics than the previously-known auction styles. To 
reiterate: while such evolved market mechanisms are unlike any human-designed 
mechanism, they could nevertheless readily be implemented as online electronic 
marketplaces.  
 
Thus, one contribution of this paper is the confirmation that the evolution of one-sided 
Qs=~0.0 results for M1 and M2 in [6] were consequences of (unrealistically) using 
unchanging supply and demand curves for the duration of each experiment. The results 
presented here show that, for dealing with shock changes in the M1-2, M2-1, M1-2-1, 
and M2-1-2 cases, Qs=~0.0 is not the best value, even though it was the optimum for M1 D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             24 
and M2 individually. A second contribution is the confirmation that the optimum Qs 
value is order-dependent in both the dual-schedule and the triple-schedule experiments: 
e.g. that the evolved value of Qs for M1-2 is different to that for M2-1, and different 
again for M1-2-1 and M2-1-2. A third contribution is the hypothesis suggested by these 
data, i.e. that the CDA may be best when nothing can be predicted about the nature of the 
supply and demand curves, but that hybrid two-sided non-CDA mechanisms may be 
optimal when some regularity can be observed in the supply and demand schedules.  
 
5. Related Work 
The field of automated design of online auction markets by genetic algorithm is very 
new. To the best of my knowledge, it appears that the first paper in this field was the 
initial publication on evolving Qs for ZIP-trader marketplaces [6]. The key results in that 
paper have since been replicated by Robinson [18] and by Qin [19]. In particular, Qin 
used a different genetic encoding that allowed true versions of the one-sided English and 
Dutch-Flower auctions to be evolved, but hybrid auction mechanisms were still settled on 
by the GA. Qualitatively similar results have also since been demonstrated in e-
marketplaces populated by non-ZIP software-agent traders [10]. Results from a similar 
research project, using another evolutionary algorithm (i.e., genetic programming) for 
mechanism design in a different context, have subsequently been published [17]. Most 
recently, Byde [2] has published results from using a genetic algorithm to develop new 
forms of sealed-bid auction mechanism, independent of the intelligence (or lack of 
intelligence) of the traders taking part in those auctions. Significantly, Byde demonstrates 
that hybrid auction mechanisms (similar in spirit to the hybrid “non-standard” Qs values 
evolved here) are found by the GA to be optimal for a number of realistic scenarios.  D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             25 
6. Conclusions 
It is widely acknowledged within artificial evolution research that blind evolutionary 
search processes such as that implemented by the GA used here will frequently improve 
fitness via ruthless exploitation of any regularity in the task environment. We have seen 
that, although in the minority of the experiments reported here no such regularity was 
identified for exploitation, in the majority of our experiments there was an underlying 
regularity that allowed an evolved hybrid market mechanism to be more efficient. Thus, 
the major contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that, even when there are shock 
changes in supply and demand, there may be sufficient regularity in some market 
situations such that non-CDA hybrid two-sided auctions are more efficient than any 
human-designed market mechanism. Given these results, coupled with the results of Das 
et al. [11] who demonstrated that ZIP artificial trading agents reliably outperform human 
traders in experimental CDA settings, it seems plausible to conjecture that, in future, 
some or possibly all major financial markets will be implemented as e-marketplaces 
populated by autonomous software-agent traders. In such an agent-dominated future, 
market mechanisms originally designed for human traders may not be the most efficient; 
and the results of this paper demonstrate that new hybrid mechanisms can be evolved that 
are more efficient than traditional human-designed markets. 
 
Even if such hybrids are only a few percentage points more efficient than conventional 
human-designed mechanisms, it seems perfectly plausible that the results of using these 
artificially-evolved auction-mechanism designs in major financial markets (populated by 
artificial trading agents) will be savings or profits measured in billions of dollars.  
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Figure 1: Supply and demand schedules for markets M1 (top left), M2 (top right), M3 
(bottom left) and M4 (bottom right). In all three figures, the horizontal axis is quantity 
(from 0 to 12) and the vertical axis is price (from 0.00 to 4.00). The upward-sloping 
supply curve is shown by the solid line, and the downward-sloping demand curve is 
shown by the broken line.   
 
 
 D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             31 
 
 
Figure 2a (upper graph): fitness scores of all 30 members of the population for each 
generation. Horizontal axis is generation number (0 to 500); vertical axis is fitness score 
(0 to 20). Figure 2b (lower graph): Fitness score of the elite individual (i.e., the best 
genotype, with the lowest score) in each generation for the experiment shown in Figure 2a. 
Horizontal axis is generation number (0 to 500); vertical axis is fitness score (3.5 to 5.0).
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Figure 3: Evolutionary trajectory of mean (plus and minus one s.d.; n=36) value of Qs in 
the best elite mode of the 50 experiments shown in Figure 3. Mean Qs settles to ~0.23
 
Figure 4:  Average elite fitnesses from 50 EM and 50 FM(Qs=0.5) M1-2 experiments; 
data is plotted for mean fitness, plus and minus one s.d.: best EM fitness mode settles to a 
mean of approx 3.85 with a s.d. of approx 0.06 (n=36); FM values settle to a mean of 
around 4.05 with a s.d. of approx. 0.1 (n=49). 
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Schedule  EM:µ EM:σ  EM:n FM:µ FM:σ FM:n 1%? Qs:µ Q s:σ 
M1 3.22  0.024  5  4.45  0.155  48 Y 0.000  0.0002
M2 2.16  0.103  45  3.13  0.141  50  Y  0.069  0.0426
M3 5.19  0.127  50  5.52  0.168  50  Y  0.158  0.0312
M4 0.60  0.045  50 0.72  0.045  50 Y 0.686  0.0433
 
Table 1: Summary of results from dual-schedule (single-shock) experiments. The column 
labelling is explained in the text.   
 
Schedule  EM:µ EM:σ  EM:n FM:µ FM:σ FM:n 1%? Qs:µ Q s:σ 
M1-2  3.85  0.058  36 4.04  0.078  49 Y 0.226  0.0309
M2-1 4.18  0.102  46 4.18  0.092  50 N  0.456  0.0312
M2-3 3.94  0.138  49 3.98  0.128  48 N  0.561  0.0264
M3-2  3.05  0.056  49 3.46  0.082  50 Y 0.137  0.0254
M1-4  2.78  0.061  36 3.08  0.069  50 Y 0.211  0.0263
M4-1  2.79  0.094  50 2.97  0.093  50 Y 0.380  0.0237
M4-3  3.01  0.131  50 3.25  0.118  50 Y 0.364  0.0184
M3-4  3.17  0.078  50 3.47  0.083  50 Y 0.212  0.0294
M2-4 3.57  0.128  49 3.59  0.117  49 N  0.405  0.0394
M4-2  2.69  0.079  50 2.76  0.075  50 Y 0.276  0.0754
 
Table 2: Summary of results from dual-schedule (single-shock) experiments. The column 
labelling and formatting is the same as for Table 1.   D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             34 
 
Schedule  EM:µ EM:σ  EM:n  FM:µ FM:σ  FM:n 1%?  Qs:µ Q s:σ 
M1-2-1  4.35  0.084  46 4.32  0.076  49 N  0.509  0.0231 
M2-1-2  3.92  0.073  50 3.91  0.076  49 N  0.497  0.0263 
M2-3-2  2.99  0.075  49 3.00  0.097  49 N  0.584  0.0266 
M3-2-3  3.87  0.070  50 3.86  0.087  50 N  0.528  0.0200 
M1-2-3  4.24  0.066  50 4.28  0.076  50 Y 0.564  0.0238 
M3-2-1  3.98  0.050  50 3.98  0.067  50 N  0.473  0.0218 
 
Table 3: Summary of results from dual-shock experiments where each shock involves a 
major change only to the demand curve. The column labelling and formatting is the same 
as for Table 1.  
 
Schedule  EM:µ EM:σ  EM:n  FM:µ FM:σ  FM:n 1%?  Qs:µ Q s:σ 
M1-4-1  3.25  0.083  40 3.75  0.083  50 Y 0.187  0.0225 
M4-1-4  2.30  0.077  50 2.49  0.052  50 Y 0.368  0.0205 
M4-3-4  2.83  0.056  50 2.85  0.057  50 N  0.448  0.0181 
M3-4-3  3.52  0.083  50 4.21  0.083  50 Y 0.146  0.0213 
M1-4-3  3.25  0.101  39 3.90  0.084  50 Y 0.165  0.0199 
M3-4-1  3.56  0.082  49 4.07  0.086  50 Y 0.173  0.0230 
 
Table 4: Summary of results from dual-shock experiments where each shock involves a 
major change only to the supply curve. The column labelling and formatting is the same 
as for Table 1.  D. Cliff: Explorations in Evolutionary Market-Mechanism Design.                                                             35 
 
 
Schedule  EM:µ EM:σ  EM:n  FM:µ FM:σ  FM:n 1%?  Qs:µ Q s:σ 
M4-3-2  2.25  0.096  50 2.53  0.091  50 Y 0.348  0.0226 
M2-3-4  3.00  0.087  49 3.09  0.098  50 Y 0.575  0.0238 
M4-1-2  2.97  0.078  50 3.11  0.067  50 Y 0.379  0.0188 
M2-1-4  3.29  0.082  48 3.31  0.074  50 N  0.492  0.0300 
 
Table 5: Summary of results from dual-shock experiments where one shock involves a 
major change only to the demand curve and the other involves a major change only to the 
supply curve. The column labelling and formatting is the same as for Table 1.  
 
Schedule  EM:µ EM:σ  EM:n  FM:µ FM:σ  FM:n 1%?  Qs:µ Q s:σ 
M2-4-2  3.83  0.088  50 3.95  0.096  50 Y 0.332  0.0276 
M2-4-2  3.14  0.068  50 3.14  0.084  50 N  0.496  0.0271 
 
Table 6: Summary of results from dual-shock experiments where each shock involves 
major changes to both the supply curve and the demand curve. The column labelling and 
formatting is the same as for Table 1.  